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David Martin's review of our book, Citizenship Without Consent: Ille-
gal Aliens in the American Polity, represents a serious, thoughtful, and
constructive effort to take up our challenge to reconsider the prevailing
view of birthright citizenship. But despite Professor Martin's scrupulous
fairness, readers of his review may well form misconceptions about our
arguments on several points-misconceptions for which we acknowledge
some responsibility. We write in order to correct them and to note that
Professor Martin's analysis ultimately underscores the essential message
of our work.
The misconceptions are three-fold. First, Professor Martin interprets
our argument that Congress possesses power under the Constitution to
decide on birthright citizenship for children of illegal and temporary
aliens as a policy recommendation that Congress refuse to grant such
citizenship. Our book, however, reviews several of the pros and cons but
takes no stance on that policy issue, maintaining that in "the current
state of knowledge, it is not at all obvious" what American policy should
be.' Second, Martin describes our position as "aggressively consensual-
ist," mitigated only by considerations that he suggests may be merely
"expedient. ' 2 We noted frequently, however, that while we do favor
making choices governing citizenship more self-conscious and explicit,
we also regard commitments to fundamental human rights as authorita-
tive and would restrain consensualism to preserve them.3 Finally, Pro-
fessor Martin presents an alternative, Burkean understanding of consent
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that he thinks we have slighted. He does not, however, mention our sev-
eral discussions and criticisms of that outlook-criticisms that his argu-
ments exemplify. We believe that such a Burkean position renders
consent more mythic than real, and that Professor Martin's use of it im-
plies that individuals cannot be trusted to decide for themselves on citi-
zenship issues.
I.
In attacking the ascriptive conception of citizenship and the traditional
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment's citizenship clause that it
has nourished, we have sought to advance public debate on what is per-
haps the most fundamental issue in any polity-the nature of political
membership and the manner in which it may be attained. Although that
issue has been widely considered closed for a century or more, the recent
increase in the influx of illegal aliens has given it renewed saliency. We
demonstrate, apparently to Professor Martin's satisfaction, that the citi-
zenship clause is ambiguous concerning the scope of constitutionally
mandated birthright citizenship. 4 We then argue that the clause can best
be made to accord with American constitutional theory and the nation's
laws of citizenship by interpreting it in light of the more Lockean under-
standing of birthright citizenship advanced by certain influential writers
on international law, especially Vattel and Burlamaqui. That interpreta-
tion would empower Congress to decide, as a policy matter, whether the
nation should extend birthright citizenship in the future to children born
in the United States whose parents have never been granted permanent
resident status. If we are right about Congress' authority in this regard,
then a choice on this matter cannot be evaded: to refuse to choose, of
course, is to choose the status quo. Because that status quo is unsatisfac-
tory, as Professor Martin agrees, we proceed to review a number of con-
siderations that Congress should ponder in designing policy on this
score.
5
Professor Martin neither recounts nor responds to our contention that
our view of birthright citizenship, grounded in the theories of Vattel and
Burlamaqui, describes consensual membership better than the common
law rule ofjus soli. He similarly ignores our claim that this interpreta-
tion best fits the language of the clause and the ways in which American
lawmakers have defined the statuses of Native Americans and permanent
resident aliens. Instead, his criticisms center on what he takes to be our
4. Martin, supra note 2, at 280-81.
5. Id. at 288.
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proposal for how Congress should legislate with regard to the children of
illegal aliens and on our general philosophic conception of consent.
While the first line of attack is misguided, since we do not advise Con-
gress to adopt such a policy, we acknowledge that our text is sometimes
confusing on this point.6 And we regard as quite premature Professor
Martin's claim that the "practical disadvantages" accompanying at-
tempts to address illegal immigration via citizenship rules are "so over-
whelming that they should remove this option from consideration. ' 7 In
the end, we and Congress might well agree that this is so. But because of
the prevailing, unquestioned interpretation of the citizenship clause, the
issue has not yet even been discussed. Some of Professor Martin's argu-
ments against such a policy have merit. Yet he fails to note that in the
final ten pages of our book we consider all those arguments, as well as a
number of others-and we show repeatedly that, however forceful they
might be as policy claims, they do not justify denying Congress the con-
stitutional power even to explore such measures. (We even called this
section "a reply to critics").
Professor Martin does cite our contention that a denial of birthright
citizenship to children of illegal and non-immigrant aliens is conceivable
only as a small part of a broader, coordinated immigration strategy that
would involve inclusive as well as restrictive measures. He nevertheless
contends that it is wholly unthinkable, since if these measures do not
work, an underclass of disadvantaged children would grow up in this
country.8 This presumes, of course, that the package of reforms that we
describe would be ineffective. Yet Professor Martin neither explains why
this should be so nor suggests any alternative approach. He also neglects.
our observations that the children of illegal aliens would still be entitled
to due process and equal protection guarantees, that they would almost
always have a nationality elsewhere that they could assume, and that in
any case Congress could admit to permanent residence or citizenship all
who proved to be stateless or otherwise seriously in need. 9 We state spe-
cifically that "if the nation adopted these measures but found that they
did not diminish the number of children born of illegal alien parents who
had spent most of their lives here and had acquired humanitarian claims
.6. For example, on p. 136, we contrast "our proposal" to "the current birthright citizen-
ship rule." The discussion indicates that the "proposal" in question is our suggestion that we
view the Constitution as giving Congress the authority to render citizenship policy "as gener-
ous (or as niggardly) as Americans self-consciously decide to make it." But these passages
may easily be misread as endorsing a policy proposal in opposition to the status quo.
7. Martin, supra note 2, at 288; see also id. at 282-84.
8. Id. at 281-82.
9. Pp. 100, 165 n.15.
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to membership, Congress would retain the power to extend a generous
amnesty or naturalization policy toward them," and that in principle,
"we strongly favor such an 'amnesty' for long-term resident illegal aliens
and their families." 10
Professor Martin can only object, then, that if such policies did not
work, he would expect Congress to reject these measures and to treat
illegal aliens cruelly. As we argue in the book, we believe instead that
such an expectation betrays "lack of confidence in the justice of consen-
sual political self-definition," and that "contemporary Americans will de-
cide generously.""1 He would have us maintain a constitutional
guarantee that Americans never explicitly considered, much less consen-
sually adopted, rather than risk allowing Congress the power that it now
exercises with respect to all other classes of aliens.
Professor Martin's major example of the difficulties our approach
might entail shows that his fears about the trustworthiness of individual
choices extend to aliens as well as to citizens. He notes that many Euro-
pean countries have long had "guest worker" programs without auto-
matically providing citizenship either to those workers or to any children
born during their stay. He further observes that many of those guest
workers and their children remain in their host nations for long periods,
and that although the countries are encouraging them to naturalize, few
are choosing to do So. 12 Professor Martin apparently concludes that it
would be better if they did not have to choose to become citizens. He
does not contend, however, that they agree. It may well be that igno-
rance or other obstacles are preventing these persons from accepting the
offers of naturalization available to them. By itself, however, their failure
to do so hardly justifies ascribing citizenship to them.
II.
Perhaps reflecting his worries about how people may choose, Professor
Martin denigrates our stress on actual consent as "dogmatic consensual-
ism," and he observes that while "[c]onsent is basic to . . . especially
American democracy, it is not the only principle." 13 We agree, as our
repeated insistence upon human rights indicates. We noted, moreover,
that there is a recurring, fundamental tension in America's liberal demo-
cratic constitutional traditions. As predominantly Lockean liberals,
10. Pp. 99-100, 135, 137.
11. Pp. 119, 121. Admittedly, this is an article of faith but it is one, we think, that Profes-
sor Martin generally shares--and in any event does not dispute.
12. Martin, supra note 2, at 282-83.
13. Id. at 288, 292 (emphasis in original).
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Americans have always "wished to base governmental legitimacy on con-
sent, yet they also wished to insist that there were minimal but funda-
mental human rights that could never be legitimately violated."
14
Professor Martin is clearly disturbed about the possibility of such vio-
lations, but he wholly ignores this aspect of our argument. It is true that
we do not discuss the complex topic of basic human rights at great
length. We thought it sufficient for our purposes to observe that
America's constitutional traditions (and most writers on human rights)
identify those rights as including the sorts of minimal guarantees in-
cluded in the Declaration of Independence, and the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution. They are rarely said to in-
lude natural rights to membership in specific polities, 15 nor do we un-
derstand Professor Martin to be arguing otherwise.
We also recognized the validity of concerns about protecting innocent
children. We showed that children should and already do possess "cer-
tain procedural and substantive rights" so that they could not in any case
"be treated as the Dred Scott decision treated blacks. ' 16 But we also
observed that, except for those children whose long residence had made
them "part of the actual, organic community that is produced by shared
experiences," it simply did not follow "that citizenship as distinguished
from mere nondiscrimination, should be the prize" to which their human
rights entitle them. 17 That is why we concluded, following Locke, Vat-
tel, and certain other liberal theorists and legal writers, that Americans
should seek in this area to harmonize consent and human rights by rec-
ognizing our powers of deliberative collective choice and employing them
in humane ways.'
8
Professor Martin might dispute these arguments by contending that
human rights do include rights to citizenship in a particular polity, and at
one point he appears about to do so.' 9 But he.foregoes any explicit en-
dorsement of this position, for he acknowledges the legitimacy of consen-
sually setting some limits on claims to membership. 20 Instead, he
neglects our analysis of rights and balances his own commitments to con-
14. P. 30.
15. Pp. 24-25, 48-49, 98, 100-01, 137.
16. Pp. 98-100, 137. For this reason, Professor Martin's suggestion that our position
might prove repressive and harmful in the manner of Dred Scott, see Martin, supra note 2, at
295, is wholly unwarranted and, for Professor Martin, uncharacteristically hyperbolic.
17. Pp. 98, 134, 137.
18. Pp. 30, 48, 101.
19. Martin, supra note 2, at 293.
20. Id. at 294-95.
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sent largely with "pragmatic concerns" that the political community or
individual aliens might decide unwisely.
21
It seems questionable, however, whether these pragmatic judgments
are so compelling as to justify limiting the opportunities for choice that
we defend for citizens and outsiders alike. In addition to criticizing our
view of congressional power under the citizenship clause, Professor Mar-
tin also takes exception to our proposals that eighteen-year-olds be in-
formed that they have a right of expatriation, and that they be permitted
to exercise it while remaining in the country as resident aliens. His con-
cern here parallels his fear regarding the children of European guest
workers: even though they would lose much and gain only rather sym-
bolic benefits, some eighteen-year-olds might still choose not to be citi-
zens.22 They can, it seems, be trusted to vote and at times be required to
fight for their country, but they should not be encouraged to consider
whether they wish to belong to it.
Again, Professor Martin's view displays a lack of faith in individual
capacities to choose responsibly that strikes us as excessive. He questions
whether it is "psychologically plausible" to believe that people regard
explicit consent as more binding than tacit consent; and he worries again
about permitting persons to reside in a country having chosen not to be
its citizens.23 These arguments, however, prove too much. They imply
that we should make all within our borders citizens whether they want it
or not. The proper term for the status based on that principle is subject-
ship, not citizenship.
III.
Finally, Professor Martin moves beyond his appeal to pragmatism to
rest his objections on a "more complex and nuanced" conception of con-
sent than we entertain. 24 Consent, he asserts, while citing Alexander
Bickel and Edmund Burke, is not established by specific periodic choices
so much as by feelings born of "[t]ime and familiarity. ' 25 Many of our
affiliations are "constitutive" of ourselves, he points out, and while we
may eventually change them, we do so through "an organic process, not
21. Id. at 288.
22. Id. at 288-89.
23. Id. at 289-90. We also considered and rejected a possible objection to our position
based upon the notion of tacit consent, pp. 130-32, a discussion that Professor Martin fails to
mention.
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the radical act of .a sovereign individual." 26  Such consent is
"recogniz[ed]" and "anchor[ed]" by "ascriptive citizenship rules." 27
This organic, communitarian conception of the self and political mem-
bership is also repeatedly mentioned in our book.28 We do not simply
dismiss it; indeed, as mentioned above, we urge Congress to extend citi-
zenship to illegal aliens and their children whenever long residence has
made them "organically part of and dependent upon the American com-
munity." 29 But we remain wary of giving legal recognition to claims that
certain affiliations are "anterior to choice" and are to be altered not so
much by specific concrete decisions of the polity and of the individual as
by a rather mystical "organic process."' 30 We would still prefer "to make
the terms of national and individual consent as explicit as possible.
'31
Professor Martin terms that goal "anachronistic, ' 32 and he is right that it
reflects in part our sense, reinforced during the 1960's and early 1970's,
of how hollow claims of "tacit consent" can be under present arrange-
ments. We see no reason, however, to rest satisfied with ascription sim-
ply because we now live in "Ronald Reagan's 1980's."1
33
While choice has its own real dangers, which we painstakingly docu-
ment in our book,34 appeals to "tacit" consent and "organic" affiliations
have always been convenient vehicles for denying any genuine self-deter-
mination. If our various inherited and longstanding affiliations are so
crucial to us-and we believe that they are-they will receive due weight
in collective and individual deliberations over membership. Far from
portraying any of these choices as "apparently cost-free," as Professor
Martin avers,35 we repeatedly stress the complexities and high risks at-
tendant on almost any choice.36 But again, choice cannot really be
avoided; the proper response to these difficulties is more informed and
reflective decisionmaking, not legal restrictions on opportunities to
choose.
We believe that our view is consonant with the preponderance of dem-
ocratic theory, Lockean liberalism, and American constitutionalism.
Professor Martin disagrees. Significantly, he justifies this disagreement
26. Id. at 292-93.
27. Id. at 293.
28. See e.g., pp. 20, 39-40, 98-99, 134, 143 n.23.
29. Pp. 98-99, 134.
30. Martin, supra note 2, at 292.
31. P. 131.
32. Martin, supra note 2, at 291.
33. Id.
34. E.g., pp. 37-40, 42-43, 63-72.
35. Id. at 293.
36. See, e.g., pp. 119-20, 123-25.
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by appealing not to those traditions so much as to "pragmatic" concerns
about human folly and to Edmund Burke. We respect his position. But
in advancing it, we think Professor Martin's review reveals the validity of
our basic contention-that the issues we raise compel Americans to re-
visit, to rethink, and to see in a new light the first principles we rely on in
defining the basis of citizenship. And if, as his analysis suggests, rejection
of our views requires one to abandon more explicit consent and Locke in
favor of tacit consent and Burke, we remain confident that we have ex-
pounded a position that better resonates with the values of both Ameri-
can political theory and constitutional law.
